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ABSTRACT 
The paper uses survey data to analyse the financing conditions of firms in 
transition countries. The results show that small firms have considerably 
more problems with access to and cost of finance than larger firms. Small 
firms also display markedly different financing patterns than large firms, 
relying to a much greater extent on internal financing sources and less on 
bank credit or other sources of formal finance than large firms. To examine 
the determinants of access to and cost of finance the survey data are 
combined with macro and financial variables in an ordered logit model. The 
results indicate that a heavy reliance on foreign and state-owned banks has 
adverse effects on the average firm’s financing condition. 
Keywords: Access to and Cost of Finance, SME Finance, Transition 
Countries 
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF FIRMS’ FINANCING CONDITIONS 
IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1990s, the financial markets of transition countries 
(TCs)1 underwent dramatic changes. The existing “monobank” or one-tier 
banking systems were replaced by two-tier systems which comprise a central 
bank and commercial banks. Banking sectors were completely restructured 
and largely privatised and capital markets were established. Albeit the 
financial sectors of the TCs considered in this article are obviously all 
                                        
* German Development Institute, Tulpenfeld 6, 53113 Bonn, Germany. Tel.: +49 228 
949 27 245. Fax: +49 228 949 27 130. Email: ulrich.volz@die-gdi.de 
1 With TCs this paper refers to the 28 countries of central eastern Europe and the Baltic states 
(CEB: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia), 
south-eastern Europe (SEE: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia) and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan). 
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different, there are three features that are characteristic for almost all of 
them, despite partly different approaches to market reform. First, even more 
than 15 years after the start of reform, financial sectors in most TCs show a 
relatively low level of financial deepening when compared with countries at a 
similar stage of economic development. Second, financial sectors are still 
largely dominated by banking activities. And third, banking sectors in most 
TCs show a very high degree of foreign bank ownership and a high degree of 
concentration.2 
As the second decade of the transition process is coming to a close, it 
is worth taking stock and asking what has been achieved in TCs’ financial 
markets and what are the problems that remain. Several aspects are of 
interest. Did financial market reform lead to a general improvement of 
financing conditions? Are there any differences in financing conditions and 
patterns between firms of different size? What effects, if any, does the 
involvement of foreign banks have on the financing of businesses? What are 
the main factors that influence access to and cost of finance? These are all 
questions that will be addressed in this paper. Given that a well-known 
problem in finance is the tendency of banks to serve larger clients because of 
information asymmetry that may lead to adverse selection and thus credit 
rationing for smaller businesses (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981), a particular focus in 
this article is put on the access to and cost of finance of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). 
The article is structured as follows. Section two presents the results of 
business surveys that were conducted by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank in 2002 and 
2005 in 26 TCs and in 2004 in six industrialized countries with respect to the 
financing conditions of firms in these countries. Section three then applies an 
ordered logit model to investigate the determinants of access to and cost of 
finance for firms in TCs. Section four concludes. 
ACCESS TO AND COST OF FINANCE IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES 
To investigate the financing conditions of firms in TCs, this section 
analyses data from a Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS), which was implemented jointly by the EBRD and the World 
Bank. The BEEPS aims to investigate the extent to which government policies 
and practices facilitate or impede business activity and investment in central 
and (south)eastern Europe and the CIS. It also includes unique information 
on the access to finance and the financing conditions for firms in the region. 
The BEEPS was first conducted in 1999 and then again in modified form in 
                                        
2 On the characteristics of TCs’ financial sectors see Volz (2009). 
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2002 and 2005. The 2002 BEEPS covers 6,153 firms in 26 TCs, while the 
2005 survey covers 9,097 firms for the same countries3.  In 2004, BEEPS was 
conducted in six industrialised countries (Germany, Portugal, Greece, South 
Korea, Spain, Ireland), collecting information on 3,953 firms4.  
In the following, the results of the BEEPS 2002 and 2005 are examined 
to see whether the surveys indicates differences in the financing conditions 
of SMEs and large firms, and over the years. The 2004 BEEPS results for 
industrialised countries help to set the results for the TCs into perspective. It 
is important to note that for the BEEPS firms were asked to appraise the 
conditions of their business environment and that some of these evaluations 
– like the perception of access to finance – are subjective by nature. Hence 
the judgments of firms of different size, location and nationality cannot be 
compared at face value. Nevertheless, the BEEPS gives a best possible 
picture of the sentiment in the TCs and also contains “hard” data such as 
information on firm’s sources of finance. 
Among others, firms were asked in the BEEPS how problematic 
different factors are for the operation and growth of their businesses. Table 
1 displays the results for the firms’ responses on how big a problem they 
perceive access to financing (e.g. collateral required) and the cost of 
financing (e.g. interest rates and charges). Firms were asked to answer on a 
score from 1 (no obstacle) to 4 (major obstacle). 
The upper part of Table 1 gives the average score for all firms that 
were questioned in the TCs with respect to access to financing. We can see 
that access to finance has improved slightly for the average firm from a value 
of 2.33 in 2002 to 2.26 in 2005. Analysing the results by the size of firms 
shows that small firms (with 2-49 employees) on average find it harder to 
obtain financing than medium-sized firms (50-249 employees), which in turn 
seem to have bigger problems in accessing finance than large firms (250-
9,999 employees)5.  
The same seems to be true for the cost of financing as shown in the 
lower part of Table 1: on average, smaller firms perceive the cost of 
financing as a greater obstacle for the operation and growth of their 
                                        
3 The 26 countries covered in the BEEPS 2002 and 2005 surveys are the same TCs listed in 
footnote one with the exception of Turkmenistan. In the surveys, Serbia and Montenegro were 
still treated as one unit; hence we have 26 countries instead of 28. The BEEPS 2002 and 2005 
were also conducted in Turkey, which is excluded in the following analysis. The 1999 BEEPS 
featured different questions than the subsequent surveys; hence the results are not fully 
comparable and we limit the analysis here to the BEEPS conducted afterwards. For an 
examination of the 2002 BEEPS see Volz (2004). 
4 The 2004 BEEPS covers also Vietnam, which was excluded here. 
5 Firms with less than two or more than 10,000 employees were excluded from the BEEPS. 
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businesses than do medium-sized and large firms. As we can see from Table 
2, the differences in firm size with respect to the conditions for access to and 
cost of financing are not specific to TCs. Apparently, the same pattern holds 
in industrialised countries, even though firms there on average seem to have 
less problems with finance than those in TCs (which is exactly what one 
would expect). 
Table 1: Financing Conditions in Transition Countries, 2002 and 2005  
Access to Finance 
 2002 2005 
 No. of Observations Mean SD No. of Observations Mean SD 
All firms 5,810 2.33 1.16 8,647 2.26 1.14 
Small firm 3,902 2.38 1.17 6,065 2.31 1.14 
Medium 
firm 
1,074 2.23 1.13 1,728 2.20 1.11 
Large firm 807 2.18 1.15 853 2.01 1.10 
Cost of Finance 
 2002 2005 
 No. of Observations Mean SD No. of Observations Mean SD 
All firms 5,864 2.53 1.13 8,698 2.51 1.13 
Small firm 3,931 2.55 1.14 6,097 2.56 1.14 
Medium 
firm 
1,088 2.52 1.10 1,746 2.47 1.11 
Large firm 819 2.42 1.10 854 2.28 1.12 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 and 2005 datasets. 
Note:  The average score is based on a scale of 1 (no obstacle) to 4 (major obstacle). The 
exact question was: “Can you tell me how problematic are these different factors for 
the operation and growth of your business: Access to financing (e.g., collateral required 
or financing not available from banks) / Cost of financing (e.g., interest rates and 
charges)”. 
From the average results in Tables 1 and 2 one could conclude that 
while differences in financing conditions between firms of different size and 
between firms in TCs and industrialised countries exist, they might not be so 
grave as to give cause for concern. But the picture becomes more complete 
when the sources of finance are reviewed. Tables 3 and 4 show the sources 
of finance for working capital and new investment for all firms questioned in 
the TCs for 2002 and 2005, and also by size of firm. Tables 5 and 6 show the 
results for firms in industrialised countries. 
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Table 2: Financing Conditions in Industrialised Countries, 2004 
Access to Finance 
 No. of Observations Mean SD 
All firms 3,873 2.02 1.09 
Small firms 3,002 2.05 1.10 
Medium firms 496 2.02 1.07 
Large firms 375 1.81 0.98 
Cost of Finance 
 No. of Observations Mean SD 
All firms 3,884 2.14 1.11 
Small firms 3,012 2.17 1.13 
Medium firms 497 2.08 1.05 
Large firms 375 2.02 1.04 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2004 dataset. 
Note: The BEEPS 2004 included the identical questions as BEEPS 2005. BEEPS 2004 was 
conducted in Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, South Korea and Spain (and Vietnam, 
which was excluded here). 
Interesting to note is that the proportion of external finance as part of 
the total financing is rather small in TCs, and that borrowing from banks in 
general is very low. On average, about 70 per cent of both working capital 
and new investment of firms in TCs is generated from internal sources 
(Tables 3 and 4), considerably higher than the shares in industrialised 
countries (65 per cent for working capital and 57 per cent for new 
investment in 2004; cf. Tables 5 and 6). Accounting for firm size, again, we 
find pronounced differences in financing between small, medium and large 
firms: in TCs, small firms rely to a much greater extent on internal funds 
(about 75 per cent for working capital and 73 percent for new investment in 
2005) than medium-sized firms (71 and 68 per cent) and large firms (65 per 
cent for both working capital and new investment in 2005). The fact that 
firms have a different financing structure does not necessarily imply that this 
is constraining their activities or costly to them. However, empirical evidence 
provided by de Haas and Peeters (2006) suggests that the high reliance of 
firms in TCs on internal finance is sub-optimal. This clearly points to 
constraints of firms, especially smaller ones, in TCs in accessing external 
financing. 6 
                                        
6 From a survey of new firms in TCs Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) find that little 
demand for external finance is also due to weak property rights which discourage firms from 
investing, even when bank loans are available. 
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Table 3: Sources of Finance for Working Capital in Transition Countries, 2002 and 2005 
                          
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 and 2005 datasets. 
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Table 4: Sources of Finance for New Investments in Transition Countries, 2002 and 2005 
 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 and 2005 datasets. 
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Table 5: Sources of Finance for Working Capital in Industrialised Countries, 2004 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2004 dataset. 
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Table 6: Sources of Finance for New Investments in Industrialised Countries, 2004 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2004 dataset. 
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Particularly interesting is the share of bank financing. In 2005, 9.7 per 
cent of working capital of firms in TCs was financed on average by local 
private commercial banks, state-owned banks and foreign banks, and 13.2 
per cent of long-term financing came from these banks. This reflects the still 
relatively low level of financial deepening in most TCs, which is also apparent 
in their low bank lending to GDP ratios. The low levels of bank finance in TCs 
contrast with the role of bank lending in industrialised countries, where on 
average 15.1 per cent of firm’s working capital and 19.9 per cent of new 
investment is financed by banks. That is, the shares of bank finance are 
about fifty per cent higher in industrialised countries. 
With respect to firm size, we also see significant differences in bank 
financing. In 2005, large firms’ borrowing from banks for working capital as 
share of total financing was about double when compared with small firms in 
TCs. The role of bank financing for new investment in TCs in 2005 was 
similarly uneven, with 11.7 per cent of small firm investment financed by 
banks, contrasted with 15.7 per cent for medium-sized firms and 18.2 per 
cent for large firms. The same patterns holds for industrialised countries, 
where small firms finance 13.6 (17.2) per cent of working capital (new 
investment) through banks, compared with 17.6 (26.0) per cent for medium-
sized firms and 23.9 (31.4) per cent for large firms. The fact that small firms 
finance a considerably lower share of their operations and new investments 
through banks than do medium and large firms therefore seems to be 
nothing characteristic of TCs’ financial systems. Rather, the lower level of 
bank financing in TCs can be attributed to the still much lower level of 
financial deepening, even after more than 15 years of economic transition. 
A low level of bank financing need not necessarily imply that it is 
difficult to obtain a bank loan, as it could also be the result of a preference 
for other means of financing. Yet the shares of equity finance, even though 
they increased between 2002 and 2005, or leasing arrangements – another 
common way of firm financing – are also well below the levels of 
industrialised countries. The fact that about 60 per cent of small firms in the 
CEB and SEE countries and about 70 per cent of small firms in the CIS 
countries had no bank loans in 2005 – compared to less than 40 per cent in 
Germany – is a strong indication that access to bank finance is severely 
constrained in those countries (Table 7). Table 7 also shows that about half 
of the firms that had no bank loans claimed that they were unable to obtain 
one. For the other half – which might be able to obtain a loan – the 
conditions were seemingly not attractive enough. 
Summing up, the statistical analysis of the BEEPS data so far has 
revealed two distinct patterns. First, small firms on average perceive access 
to and cost of finance to be more of a problem than do medium firms, which 
in turn seem to face more problems than large firms. This pattern is the 
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same for firms in industrialised countries, but on a considerably lower level. 
The conditions for access to and costs of finance have, however, improved 
between 2002 and 2005. While the differences in perceived problems in 
access to and costs of finance with respect to firm size do not seem grave, 
they become more important when the second finding in the BEEPS data is 
taken into account: a significant difference in sources of finance, with smaller 
firms financing a considerably higher proportion of working capital and new 
investment through internal sources and a much lower share through banks. 
Table 7: Financially Constrained Firms, in Per Cent 
 Small Firms  Medium Firms Large Firms 
 
Without 
Bank 
Loans 
Unable 
to 
Obtain 
Bank 
Loans 
Without 
Bank 
Loans 
Unable 
to 
Obtain 
bank 
loans 
Without 
Bank 
Loans 
Unable 
to 
Obtain 
Bank 
Loans 
CEB 2005 60.8 27.3 41.9 13.1 29.2 7.4 
SEE 2005 59.7 29.1 39.8 15.9 32.1 11.0 
CIS 2005 67.5 34.9 51.5 24.4 45.8 13.4 
Germany 2004 37.2 14.6 24.6 9.8 15.3 4.8 
Sources: Calculations with BEEPS 2004 and 2005 datasets. 
DETERMINANTS OF FINANCE 
 
We now turn to an empirical examination of the determinants of 
access to and cost of finance. The statistical analysis of the BEEPS data so 
far has revealed that firm size seems to have a significant impact on firm’s 
financing conditions. In the following, we combine the BEEPS data on access 
to and cost of finance of firms in TCs with other economic data to estimate 
the factors influencing firms’ financing conditions. 
 
Methodology, Literature Review and Data 
 
The literature on the determinants of firm financing highlights a 
multitude of factors, both internal to the firm and external. The way in which 
firms finance their operations depends in part on the internal resources 
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available as well as on the firm’s (or entrepreneur’s) preferences7.  
Information on internal determinants of firm financing, however, is hard to 
obtain and is not included in the BEEPS data. In the following analysis, we 
thus focus – with the exception of firm size – exclusively on external factors 
that have been discussed in the literature as having an impact on financing 
conditions and for which proxies are available. 
To inquire the determinants of access to finance we estimate the 
following model: 
AFij = α1 FSij + α2 FDj + α3 MACROj + α4 CONj + α5 FBIj + α6 CBCj + 
α7 BRIEj + α8 SOBj + εij (1) 
where;  
AFij : Access to finance of firm i in country j ; 
FSij: Firm size of firm i in country j ; 
FDj: Financial deepening in country j ; 
MACROj: Macroeconomic environment in country j ; 
CONj: Concentration in country j ’s banking sector; 
FBIj: Foreign bank involvement in country j ; 
CBCj: Cross border credit extended to country j ; 
BRIEj: Banking reform/institutional environment in country j ; and 
SOBj: Role of state-owned banks in country j. 
Because the dependent variable AFij is ordinal (i.e., 1 = no obstacle; 2 
= obstacle; 3 = serious obstacle; 4 = major obstacle) we apply a qualitative 
response regression model, namely an ordered logit model8.  It is important 
to note for the interpretation of this type of model that the parameter 
estimates cannot be directly interpreted as elasticities, but rather give an 
indication of the direction of the effects. 
We also run the regression in the same specification as above, but use 
“cost of finance” as dependent variable, so that 
CFij = β1 FSij + β2 FDj + β3 MACROj + β4 CONj + β5 FBIj + β6 CBCj + 
β7 BRIEj + β8 SOBj + εij (2) 
where CF stands for cost of finance, with everything else being same 
as before. Unless mentioned otherwise, we use data for 2005 (including 
                                        
7 See, for example, Opler et al. (1999). For a discussion of target capital structures in 
TCs see chapter four of de Haas (2005). 
8 See, for instance, Liao (1994). 
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BEEPS). The reasons for selecting the variables contained in (1) and (2) and 
the data used are described in the following. 
Firm size. Because small firms tend to face greater informational barriers 
and higher fixed cost associated with accessing financial services, they are 
likely to experience greater credit constraints than large firms9.  Also, small 
(and young) firms often lack collateral and a credit history and are hence 
more risky for lenders. Creditors are thus inclined to prefer lending to larger 
customers. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have shown that with asymmetric 
information banks have a motive to ration credit demand, and because of 
their higher riskiness smaller firms are likely to be more affected by credit 
rationing than larger firms. The role of firm size will be discussed in more 
detail below in the context of the large-bank barriers and the foreign-owned-
bank barriers hypotheses. 
As information on firm size is incorporated in the BEEPS data, we can 
easily include a firm size variable in our regression. From the analysis in the 
preceding section we already know that small firms have less favourable 
financing conditions than large firms, so we should obtain a negative 
coefficient estimate in regressions (1) and (2), as an increase in the firm size 
variable on the right hand side (2 stands for small firms, 3 for medium firms 
and 4 for large firms) should lead to improved financing conditions (i.e., 
lower values for AF and CF). 
Financial deepening. The more advanced the financial sector of its home 
country, the easier it should be for an individual firm to access finance. 
Deeper financial markets imply that more funds are obtainable through the 
financial sector, and hence firm (and household) financing should be more 
readily available. One widely used indicator of the size of financial 
intermediation is the private credit provided by deposit money banks and 
other institutions, divided by GDP. Because financial markets in most TCs are 
heavily dominated by the banking sector, domestic credit relative to GDP 
makes a useful proxy for financial deepening10.  The data is taken from the 
EBRD Country Database. 
Macroeconomic environment. Macroeconomic uncertainty makes 
business planning more difficult, affecting firms’ investment decisions and 
financing behaviour (e.g., Federer, 1993; Servén, 1998; Baum et al., 2006). 
A volatile macroeconomic environment increases financing risk and therefore 
                                        
9 See, for example, Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2006) and Beck et al. (2005, 2008). 
10 We also tried per capita income as a proxy for financial deepening, which yielded 
very similar results to those presented in tables 8 and 9. 
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financial intermediaries will demand a higher risk premium or collateral from 
firms they extend loans to, making financing conditions dearer. 
Macroeconomic volatility should thus have a negative effect on access to and 
cost of finance. As proxy for macroeconomic stability we take the CPI 
average for the period 2000-2005, using data from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics. Higher values for the MACRO variable hence imply a 
higher inflation environment, and therefore the coefficient estimates for 
MACRO should be positive. 
Concentration in the banking sector. Another factor influencing 
financing conditions might be concentration in the banking sector. The 
literature has identified two ways by which financial sector concentration 
could affect business lending. On the one hand, a high concentration in 
banking could have adverse effects especially for small firms through its 
effect on relationship lending, so that the restructuring of the TCs’ financial 
sectors might mostly benefit larger companies while SMEs will be left on their 
own11.  As pointed out by Chick (2000), competition is likely to entail 
concentration in the banking sector. If banking becomes more concentrated 
– a process that can already be observed in the TCs – large companies will 
be favoured recipients of loans and other financial services whereas small 
and medium companies, especially in peripheral regions, might find it more 
difficult to get finance12.  The so-called large-bank barriers hypothesis 
postulates that large banks tend to have difficulty extending relationship 
loans to informationally opaque small businesses (Berger et al., 2001). Large 
banks, which typically provide transaction lending and other wholesale 
capital market services to large corporate customers, tend to have 
organisational structures that are designed for efficient transaction-based 
                                        
11 Under relationship lending, according to Berger et al. (2001, pp. 2129-30), “information is 
gathered by the lender beyond the relatively transparent data available in the financial 
statements and other sources readily available at the time of origination. The information is 
gathered through contact over time with the firm, its owner, and its local community on a 
variety of dimensions. The lender may gather data from the provision of past loans and other 
services to the business. Information may also be garnered from contact with the borrower’s 
customers and suppliers, and from the lender’s knowledge of the borrower’s interaction with 
the local community. This information is used in making additional decisions over time 
regarding renewals, additional loans, renegotiations, and monitoring strategies, and is not 
shared with other potential lenders. The production of relationship information is costly, and 
the costs are likely to be passed on to the relationship borrowers.” The counterpart to 
relationship lending is pure transactions lending, under which due diligence and contract 
terms are based on information that is relatively easily on hand. Each transaction stands on its 
own, and information from the relationship between the lender and the borrower, if any, is 
irrelevant. 
12 Petersen and Rajan (1994) show that a close lending relationship with an institutional creditor 
increases the availability of finance for small firms. 
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lending. This lending is based on “hard” information such as quantitative 
financial ratios, collateral and credit scores. They often offer standardised 
credit policies based on easily observable, verifiable, and transmittable data. 
In contrast, relationship information often involves “soft” data, e.g. 
information about the character and reliability of the firm’s owner, and may 
be more difficult to quantify, verify and communicate through the layers of 
management and ownership of large banking organisations (Berger & Udell, 
2002). Furthermore, large banks may find it more difficult to engage in 
relationship lending than locally-owned institutions, as relationship lending 
may require local knowledge which large banks that are headquartered away 
will find more difficult to build up (Berger et al., 2001)13.  The large-bank 
barriers hypothesis thus predicts that higher concentration in banking would 
lead to a worsening of financing conditions of small firms, which in the 
BEEPS sample (as in the real world) make the majority of firms. 
On the other hand, a high concentration in banking might create a 
quasi-monopolistic situation, which could help banks to establish a mutually 
beneficial relationship with firms. Petersen and Rajan (1995, p. 408) argue 
that because a “monopolistic creditor […] shares in the future surplus 
generated by the firm through the future rents she is able to extract”, “she 
may be more willing to offer credit than a similarly placed lender in a 
competitive market.” Credit market competition thus may impose constraints 
on the ability of the firm and creditor to intertemporally share surplus, 
making lending relationships less valuable to a firm because it cannot expect 
to get help when most in need14.  Petersen and Rajan are able to show that 
significantly more young (and small) firms in the US obtain external financing 
in regions of the US with concentrated markets than in regions with 
competitive markets. Hence, the monopolistic-creditor hypothesis would 
                                        
13 A large body of empirical work seems to support the large-bank barriers hypothesis. For 
example, Berger et al. (1995) find that large banks in the US tend to devote a lower 
proportion of their assets to small business lending than smaller institutions. Haynes et al. 
(1999) find that large banks lend to larger, older and more financially secure businesses 
relatively more often than do small banks. That is, they seem to focus on firms that are most 
likely to receive transactions loans. Another study by Goldberg et al. (2002) finds that large 
banks have a tendency to base their small business loan approval decisions more on financial 
ratios, while the existence of a previous relationship with the borrowing firm mattered more to 
small banks. A recent Bank Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS) conducted by the 
EBRD in 2005 with a random sample of 220 banks in 20 TCs also revealed that small banks 
devote a much higher share of their lending to SMEs than large banks (de Haas et al., 2007). 
For further references see Berger et al. (2001, pp. 2131-3). 
14 Petersen and Rajan (1995) note that this argument dates back to Schumpeter, who suggested 
that a monopolistic economy offers better incentives for innovation because an innovator can 
recoup her investment in research and development through future rents. 
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predict a positive effect of increased concentration in the banking sector on 
financing conditions. 
Thus, the literature points to two different effects of banking 
concentration on relationship lending and thus on the financing conditions of 
businesses. To analyse the effect of concentration with the BEEPS data, we 
use the share of assets of the five largest banks in total banking assets, 
taken from the EBRD country database. 
Foreign bank involvement. Similarly, the involvement of foreign banks 
could have different effects. On the one hand, foreign institutions are likely 
to bring innovation and spur the efficiency of financial intermediaries and 
markets of financially less developed countries and thus improve financing 
conditions. With the entry of foreign financial intermediaries, domestic 
institutions will find themselves exposed to increased competitive pressure 
from more sophisticated and cheaper foreign intermediaries. Banks that 
extend their operations abroad are likely to be among the most efficient in 
their home country and can be expected to outperform the local banks. This 
is likely to set new standards in management and efficiency, and enhance 
the quality and range of financial products offered. Foreign institutions may 
choose to enter the market via direct penetration or cross-border acquisitions 
of intermediaries. Domestic institutions will increasingly face pressure to 
improve their own efficiency by cost-cutting and organisational restructuring 
to secure profitability. The competitive pressure should thus erode the local 
banks’ rents and lead to a more efficient financial market with better credit 
conditions for domestic firms and households15.  
On the other hand, a dominance of foreign banks could also turn out 
to be problematic if they cherry-pick their clients. The foreign-owned-bank 
barriers hypothesis states that foreign-owned banks are less likely to lend to 
informationally opaque small businesses than domestically-owned banks (cf. 
Berger et al., 2001). The argument is similar to the large-bank barriers 
hypothesis: because banks entering a foreign market are likely to be large 
and headquartered far away from small local businesses, they will find it 
difficult to extend relationship lending to these borrowers. In addition, 
cultural and language barriers, as well as non-familiarity with the local 
markets, may make it more difficult and hence costly to gather and process 
locally-based relationship information. However, a qualification needs to be 
made concerning the way foreign banks enter the market. A major reason 
for market entry through the acquisition of domestic banks is to get hold on 
the local knowledge of the bank’s management and staff and the already 
                                        
15 Evidence suggests that the entry of foreign banks has had a positive impact on the efficiency 
and stability of TCs’ banking sectors. See Bonin et al. (2005), Fries and Taci (2005), Fries et 
al. (2006) and de Haas and van Lelyveld (2006). 
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existing business relations of these banks. One would thus expect foreign 
banks to carefully maintain this local knowledge, making the argument of the 
foreign-owned-bank barriers hypothesis a less strong one if they enter the 
market through M&As16.  
To measure the effect of foreign bank involvement of financing 
conditions, we include data on the assets of foreign-owned banks relative to 
assets of all banks; the data are again taken from the EBRD country 
database. 
Cross-border bank lending. Cross-border credit provides an additional 
means of finance; firms might bypass their home country’s financial markets 
and fully finance their operations through foreign financial markets or, more 
likely, seek complementary finance abroad. The option of obtaining finance 
abroad, of course, refers not only to cross-border banking activities but also 
to the possibility of placing bonds in foreign markets or seeking listings in the 
securities markets of the major financial centres. Given the dominance of 
bank financing in TCs, however, we will focus on banking activities and thus 
add cross-border credit to specifications (1) and (2), using data on foreign 
claims of BIS reporting banks (which the Bank for International Settlement 
(BIS) publishes in its Consolidated Banking Statistics) and set these relative 
to GDP (for which we use data from the IMF’s WEO database)17.  
Because an increase in cross-border credit flowing into the economy 
should improve financing conditions for domestic firms, the estimates for the 
CBC coefficients should be negative. One caveat here is that the BIS 
                                        
16 Interestingly, the results of the already mentioned BEPS suggest that newly created foreign 
banks in TCs actually have a higher share of lending to SMEs than privatised foreign banks. 
Both newly created (41.1 per cent) and privatised foreign banks (27.0 per cent), however, still 
direct lower shares of their loan portfolios to SMEs than private domestic banks (47.0 per 
cent) (de Haas et al., 2007, p. 8). At large, empirical evidence seems to support the foreign-
owned-bank barriers hypothesis. Clarke et al. (2001, p. 20), for example, note that “[i]n 
general, foreign banks appear to allocate greater shares of their lending portfolios to 
commercial and industrial loans, providing indirect evidence that foreign banks may be more 
important in the market for loans to large companies.” De Haas and Naaborg (2005) find that 
albeit foreign banks in the TCs in many cases had a strong initial focus on multinationals and 
large domestic companies, most have gradually started to lend more also to SMEs. 
17 Foreign claims refer to claims on borrower’s resident outside the country in which the bank is 
headquartered. Foreign claims can be disaggregated into cross-border claims and local claims 
booked by foreign offices. The latter refer to claims on residents of the country in which the 
foreign office is located. For example, claims on Czech residents booked by an Austrian bank’s 
Czech-located subsidiary would be reported by Austria as local claims on the Czech Republic. 
Commercial banks and other deposit-taking institutions in 27 jurisdictions report to the BIS 
Consolidated Banking Statistics, which are estimated to cover more than 95 per cent of 
international banking business. For details on the compilation of the BIS Consolidated Banking 
Statistics see BIS (2003). 
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Consolidated Banking Statistics also comprises local lending by foreign bank 
subsidiaries, i.e., parts of the lending included in the FBI measure is included 
here as well. 
Banking reform/institutional environment. There is a vast literature 
that has studied the relationship between law and finance and how the legal 
and institutional framework affect the development of an economy’s financial 
system18.  The consensus view that has emerged is that a deficient legal 
system and a weak institutional environment cause financial sector 
distortions and thus impede financing conditions. Conversely, a better legal 
and institutional environment should lead to better financing conditions. As a 
proxy for the institutional environment in TCs, we can handily use the EBRD 
transition indicators for the progress made in banking reform and interest 
rate liberalisation. The measurement scales for the indicators range from 1 to 
4+, where 1 represents little or no change from a rigid centrally planned 
economy and a 4+ represents the standards of an industrialised market 
economy (with 0.3 decimal points added or subtracted for + and – ratings)19.  
Role of state-owned banks. Lastly, we include a variable describing the 
importance of state-owned banks in TCs. The impact of state-owned banks 
on financing conditions is not obvious. From one perspective, state-owned 
banks might lead to misallocation of resources by engaging in directed 
lending. In the worst case, state-owned banks could be misused for political 
lending or even nepotism. Moreover, because state-owned banks in most 
cases are not exposed to full market competition, they might have a 
tendency for being sluggish, distorting the efficient allocation of capital. La 
Porta et al. (2002) provide empirical support for this view. 
On the other hand, state-owned banks are less subject to pressure 
from capital markets and might have objectives other than increasing their 
                                        
18 The most prominent studies in this field are La Porta et al. (1998) and Levine (1998). For a 
discussion of the nexus between law, finance and economic growth in TCs see chapter two of 
de Haas (2005). 
19 The classification system for the banking reform and interest rate liberalisation indicator is as 
follows: 1) Little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier-system. 2) Significant 
liberalisation of interest rates and credit allocation; limited use of directed credit or interest 
rate ceilings. 3) Substantial progress in establishing bank solvency and of a framework for 
prudential supervision and regulation; full interest rate liberalisation with little preferential 
access to cheap refinancing; significant lending to private enterprises and significant presence 
of private banks. 4) Significant movement of banking laws and regulation towards BIS 
standards; well-functioning banking competition and effective prudential supervision; 
significant term lending to private enterprises; substantial financial deepening. 4+) Standards 
and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full convergence of banking laws 
and regulations with BIS standards; provision of full set of competitive banking services See 
EBRD (2006, pp. 198-9). 
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profit, i.e., they might have the political mandate to help the development of 
particular sectors with long-term importance to a country’s economic 
development or to foster the finance of small firms that otherwise might 
have problems obtaining a loan. Moreover, Micco and Panizza (2006) show 
that state-owned banks may play a useful credit-smoothing role over the 
business cycle because their lending is less responsive to macroeconomic 
shocks than the lending of private banks. From this angle, the involvement of 
state-owned banks could have positive effects on the financing conditions of 
businesses, particularly those of smaller firms20.  To examine the effect of 
state-owned banks we add a variable for the asset share of state-owned 
banks as per cent of total bank assets to our specifications (1) and (2). The 
data is taken from the EBRD Country Database. 
 
RESULTS 
The estimation results are presented in Tables 8 and 9. Because a 
lower value for AF (CF) means that a firm is experiencing less problems with 
access to finance (cost of finance), a negative coefficient in Table 8 (9) 
means an improvement in financing conditions, and vice versa. The results 
for the determinants of access to finance presented in Table 8 are pretty 
consistent and robust. Column I shows the baseline scenario, i.e., the results 
if all variables in equation (1) are included. As expected, firm size has a 
negative coefficient, which means that the larger the firm the less problems 
it is likely to have with accessing finance. When omitting other variables as in 
columns III to IX to check for robustness, the coefficient for firm size 
remains unchanged and highly significant. 
The results for the other variables in table 8 are equally robust, except 
for foreign bank involvement and cross-border credit (which will be discussed 
in more detail below). As predicted by theory, more macro volatility has a 
negative effect (and thus a positive coefficient estimate) on access to 
finance. Surprisingly, we find positive coefficients also for banking reform for 
all regressions, which suggests that reforms in the banking sector’s 
institutional environment have actually worsened access to finance – 
contradictory to what the “law and finance” literature would suggest. There 
are at least three possible explanations for this result. First, reforms in bank’s 
institutional environment might have caused a period of reshuffling, where 
banks had to adjust to new legislation and regulation, so that the positive 
                                        
20 Nitsch and Diebel (2007) give an interesting account of how state banks in China engage in a 
particular form of relationship lending, which they term “guānxi economics”. 
Ulrich Volz 
186 
 
effects of banking reforms only come to the fore in the medium run21.  The 
second explanation is that new regulations and banking supervision have 
caused banks to introduce standardised credit procedures based on easily 
observable, verifiable, and transmittable data to comply with the new rules of 
the game. According to this explanation, which follows the argumentation of 
the large-bank barriers hypothesis, relationship lending would lose 
importance, which would mostly harm small firms, which constitute the 
majority of businesses. A third explanation is that banking reform has 
reduced the problem of soft budget constraints, where unprofitable (often 
state-owned) enterprises receive too much credit from state-owned banks22.  
The results for the effect of financial deepening are again as expected; 
deeper financial markets improve access to finance. A variable where the 
effect should be unambiguous (i.e., the coefficient should be negative) is 
cross-border credit. And yet in two out of eleven regressions we get a 
positive coefficient, which might be due to specification problems or the way 
we constructed the variable. 
Regarding the effect of state-owned banks, the estimates suggest that 
a higher asset share of state-owned banks as per cent of total bank assets 
goes along with less favourable conditions for firms’ access to finance. As the 
TCs with the highest shares of state-owned banks are indeed the ones with 
the lowest levels of domestic credit to GDP ratio and the weakest institutional 
environment, a high level of state-bank involvement might also be an 
indication for misguided financial market reform (or even complete lack of 
reform). 
According to the estimates in table 8, concentration in the banking 
sector apparently improves firms’ access to finance, supporting Petersen and 
Rajan’s (1995) monopolistic-creditor hypothesis. This result is interesting as 
it stands in contrast to a relative large sample of studies in support of the 
large-bank barriers hypothesis (cf. footnote 13). 
 
                                        
21 Admittedly, this argument is not overly convincing as the transition process has 
been going on for quite a while now. 
22 On the soft budget constraint see Maskin (1999). 
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Table 8: Determinants of Access to Finance (AF) 
 
 
  Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent 
level and * at the 10 per cent level. 
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Table 9: Determinants of Cost of Finance (CF) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level and * at the 
10 per cent level. 
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Turning to the effect of foreign bank involvement on access to finance, 
we get positive coefficients for all regressions but one (in column VIII, where 
the variable for state-owned banks is omitted; the result is not significant, 
however). The results of eight out of nine regressions thus suggest that an 
increased activity of foreign banks impedes firms’ access to finance, giving 
support to the foreign-owned-bank barriers hypothesis. To analyse the effect 
of an increase in foreign bank activity for firms of different size, we construct 
a new variable, FBI*FS, which is nothing but the product of the firm size 
variable with the foreign bank involvement variable. Adding this variable to 
the baseline scenario yields the result presented in column X. The estimates 
for the other variables are virtually unchanged, but now we also obtain a 
negative estimate for FBI*FS. This can be interpreted as follows: the larger 
the firm and the higher the involvement of foreign banks, the better this 
firm’s access to finance. In other words, regression X suggests that large 
firms will benefit from foreign bank activity, whereas foreign bank 
involvement has no positive effect for smaller firms. In column X, the 
estimate for FBI*FS is not significant, but if we omit FS and FBI, FBI*FS 
becomes significant at the 1 per cent level (Column XI). 
The estimates for the determinants of cost of finance presented in 
table 9 are virtually the same as those in table 8 and confirm the patterns 
just described. Small firms face higher charges than large firms; a dominance 
of foreign and state-owned banks tends to make finance more costly; and 
foreign bank activity disproportionately favours larger firms. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of the BEEPS has shown that firms’ financing conditions in 
TCs are still considerably constrained. While progress has been made in 
establishing market-based financial systems, a large share of firms in TCs still 
has no bank loans – either because they get excluded from bank finance or 
because conditions are unfavourable. Particularly smaller firms face 
restrictions in access to finance, with about 60 per cent of small firms in the 
CEB and SEE countries and about 70 per cent of small firms in the CIS 
countries having no bank loan in 2005. 
To analyse the determinants of access to and cost of finance we 
combined the BEEPS data with variables such as foreign bank ownership and 
concentration in the banking sector and estimated an ordered logit model. 
The results indicate that a heavy reliance on foreign and state-owned banks 
have adverse effects on the average firms’ financing conditions. Albeit the 
entry and operations of foreign banks should also have positive effects such 
as a transfer of knowledge to and an increase in the efficiency of TCs’ 
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financial sectors, foreign bank activity seems to benefit only larger firms, with 
smaller firms being more or less left out. A further finding is that, according 
to our estimates, a higher concentration in the banking sector improves 
financing conditions for firms, as suggested by the monopolistic-creditor 
hypothesis. 
One should be cautious, however, to mechanistically interpret these 
findings – in the sense that a policy conclusion is drawn that, for example, 
state-owned banks should be privatised or that the role of foreign banks 
should be limited. As discussed, the effects of foreign bank entry, for 
instance, are multiple and foreign banks can also bring important benefits in 
terms of improved financial technology and efficiency to the respective host 
economies. Also, the EBRD’s 2005 survey on banking activities in TCs 
suggests that the lending behaviour of banks – especially of domestic private 
and newly created foreign banks – is changing and that their focus is slowly 
shifting away from lending to large and foreign enterprises towards SME 
lending (de Haas et al., 2007). Nevertheless, the fact that a large proportion 
of firms in TCs – and especially small firms – still has no or only limited 
access to the formal financial sector is striking and should give cause for 
concern. Policymakers and financial market regulators in TCs, as well as 
multilateral financial institutions, ought to provide a framework in which 
banks, be they domestic or international, have an incentive to extend credit 
to all types of customers. 
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